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Which of the Following Cases Established Judicial Review

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1803 U.S. Supreme Court case

1803 United States Supreme Court case

Marbury v. Madison

Supreme Court of the United States
Argued Feb 11, 1803
Decided Feb 24, 1803
Full instance name William Marbury v. James Madison, Secretarial assistant of State of the United states
Citations 5 U.Southward. 137 (more than)

1 Cranch 137; 2 50. Ed. threescore; 1803 U.S. LEXIS 352
Decision Stance
Case history
Prior Original action filed in U.Due south. Supreme Court; order to show cause why writ of mandamus should not upshot, December 1801
Holding
Department thirteen of the Judiciary Human activity of 1789 is unconstitutional to the extent it purports to enlarge the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court across that permitted by the Constitution. Congress cannot pass laws that are contrary to the Constitution, and it is the role of the judiciary to interpret what the Constitution permits.
Courtroom membership
Chief Justice
John Marshall
Associate Justices
William Cushing· William Paterson
Samuel Chase· Bushrod Washington
Alfred Moore
Case opinion
Majority Marshall, joined by Paterson, Chase, Washington
Cushing and Moore took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Laws applied
U.S. Const. arts. I, III; Judiciary Human activity of 1789 § thirteen

Marbury five. Madison , v U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was a landmark U.Southward. Supreme Court case that established the principle of judicial review in the U.s., meaning that American courts have the ability to strike downwards laws and statutes that they find to violate the Constitution of the United States. Decided in 1803, Marbury is regarded equally the single nigh important conclusion in American constitutional law.[one] The Court's landmark decision established that the U.Southward. Constitution is bodily law, not but a statement of political principles and ethics, and helped define the boundary between the constitutionally divide executive and judicial branches of the federal government.

The case originated in early 1801 every bit part of the political and ideological rivalry between approachable President John Adams and incoming President Thomas Jefferson.[2] Adams had lost the U.S. presidential election of 1800 to Jefferson, and in March 1801, just 2 days earlier his term every bit president ended, Adams appointed several dozen Federalist Political party supporters to new circuit judge and justice of the peace positions in an attempt to frustrate Jefferson and his supporters in the Democratic-Republican Party.[iii] The U.S. Senate quickly confirmed Adams'southward appointments, but upon Adams' departure and Jefferson'due south inauguration a few of the new judges' commissions still had not been delivered.[three] Jefferson believed the undelivered commissions were void and instructed his Secretarial assistant of State, James Madison, not to evangelize them.[iv] Ane of the undelivered commissions belonged to William Marbury, a Maryland businessman who had been a strong supporter of Adams and the Federalists. In late 1801, after Madison had repeatedly refused to deliver his committee, Marbury filed a lawsuit in the Supreme Court asking the Court to result a writ of mandamus forcing Madison to deliver his commission.[5]

In an opinion written by Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court held firstly that Madison's refusal to deliver Marbury'due south commission was illegal, and secondly that it was normally proper for a court in such situations to gild the government official in question to deliver the commission.[half dozen] Simply in Marbury's case, the Court did not society Madison to comply. Examining the section of the law Congress had passed that gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction over types of cases similar Marbury's, the Court found that information technology had expanded the definition of its jurisdiction across what was originally prepare forth in the U.S. Constitution.[vii] The Courtroom and then struck down that section of the police force, announcing that American courts have the ability to invalidate laws that they find to violate the Constitution.[8] Because this meant the Courtroom had no jurisdiction over the case, it could not issue the writ that Marbury had requested.

Groundwork

President John Adams, who appointed Marbury just earlier his presidential term ended.

Thomas Jefferson, who succeeded Adams and believed Marbury's undelivered commission was void.

James Madison, Jefferson'southward Secretary of State, who withheld Marbury'due south committee.

In the fiercely contested U.S. presidential election of 1800, the three main candidates were Thomas Jefferson, Aaron Burr, and the incumbent President John Adams.[ane] Adams consort the pro-business and pro-national-government politics of the Federalist Political party and its leader Alexander Hamilton, while Jefferson and Burr were role of the opposing Democratic-Republican Party, which favored agriculture and decentralization. American public stance had gradually turned confronting the Federalists in the months leading up to the election, mainly due to their use of the controversial Alien and Sedition Acts, as well every bit growing tensions with Bang-up Britain, with whom the Federalists favored close ties.[nine] Jefferson easily won the pop vote but simply narrowly defeated Adams in the Electoral College.

As the results of the election became clear, Adams and the Federalists became adamant to exercise their remaining influence before Jefferson took office and did everything they could to fill federal offices with "anti-Jeffersonians" who were loyal to the Federalists.[2] [10] On March 2, 1801, only two days before his presidential term ended,[annotation 1] Adams nominated nearly 60 Federalist supporters to new circuit judge and justice of the peace positions the Federalist-controlled Congress had recently created. These final-minute nominees—whom Jefferson's supporters derisively called the "Midnight Judges"—included William Marbury, a prosperous man of affairs from Maryland.[11] An ardent Federalist, Marbury was agile in Maryland politics and had been a vigorous supporter of the Adams presidency.[12]

The post-obit day, March three, the Senate approved Adams'southward nominations en masse. The appointees' commissions were immediately written out, so signed by Adams and sealed by Secretary of State John Marshall, who had been named the new Principal Justice of the Supreme Courtroom in January but continued too serving as secretary of land for the remainder of Adams' term.[ten] [13] Marshall so dispatched his younger brother James Markham Marshall to evangelize the commissions to the appointees.[5] With but one twenty-four hour period left before Jefferson'southward inauguration, James Marshall was able to deliver most of the commissions, but a few—including Marbury's—were non delivered.[10]

The 24-hour interval after, March 4, 1801, Jefferson was sworn in and became the third President of the United States. Jefferson instructed his new Secretary of State, James Madison, to withhold the undelivered commissions.[ten] In Jefferson's stance, the commissions were void because they had non been delivered before Adams left office.[4] Without the commissions, the appointees were unable to assume the offices and duties to which they had been appointed.

Over the next several months, Madison continually refused to deliver Marbury'south committee to him. Finally, in December 1801, Marbury filed a lawsuit confronting Madison in the U.Southward. Supreme Courtroom, asking the Courtroom to forcefulness Madison to deliver his commission.[ten] This lawsuit resulted in the case of Marbury v. Madison.

Decision

On February 24, 1803,[note 2] the Supreme Court issued a unanimous iv–0 decision[note 3] against Marbury. The Court's opinion was written by Principal Justice John Marshall, who structured the Court's opinion around a serial of three questions information technology answered in turn:

  • First, did Marbury have a right to his committee?
  • Second, if Marbury had a right to his committee, was there a legal remedy for him to obtain it?
  • 3rd, if there was such a remedy, could the Supreme Court legally issue it?[14]

Marbury's right to his committee

The Court began by determining that Marbury had a legal right to his commission. Marshall reasoned that all appropriate procedures were followed: the commission had been properly signed and sealed.[15] Madison had argued that the commissions were void if not delivered, but the Court disagreed, saying that the delivery of the commission was simply a custom, not an essential element of the commission itself.[6]

The [President'south] signature is a warrant for affixing the great seal to the commission, and the not bad seal is only to be affixed to an instrument which is complete. ... The transmission of the commission is a practice directed by convenience, only non by law. It cannot therefore be necessary to constitute the appointment, which must precede it and which is the mere act of the President.

— Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. at 158, 160.

The Court said that because Marbury's commission was valid, Madison's withholding it was "violative of a vested legal right" on Marbury'southward office.[16]

Marbury's legal remedy

Turning to the second question, the Courtroom said that the law provided Marbury a remedy for Madison'due south unlawful withholding of his commission from him. Marshall wrote that "it is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, in that location is also a legal remedy by arrange or activeness at law, whenever that right is invaded." This dominion derives from the ancient Roman legal proverb ubi jus, ibi remedium ("where there is a legal right, at that place is a legal remedy"), which was well established in the early Anglo-American common law.[17] [18] In what the American legal scholar Akhil Amar called "one of the most important and inspiring passages" of the opinion,[19] Marshall wrote:

The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the correct of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury.

— Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163.

The Court then confirmed that a writ of mandamus—a type of courtroom order that commands a regime official to perform an act their official duties legally require them to perform—was the proper remedy for Marbury's situation.[20] Only this raised the effect of whether the Courtroom, which was part of the judicial branch of the government, had the power to command Madison, who as secretary of state was part of the executive co-operative of the government.[xiv] The Court held that and then long as the remedy involved a mandatory duty to a specific person, and not a political matter left to discretion, the courts could provide the legal remedy.[21] Borrowing a phrase John Adams had drafted in 1779 for the Massachusetts Land Constitution, Marshall wrote: "The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men."[22]

The Supreme Court's jurisdiction

This brought Marshall to the third question: did the Supreme Courtroom have proper jurisdiction over the example that would allow it to consequence the writ of mandamus?[24] The answer depended entirely on how the Court interpreted the text of the Judiciary Human activity of 1789. Congress had passed the Judiciary Act to establish the American federal courtroom organisation, since the U.S. Constitution only mandates a Supreme Courtroom and leaves the rest of the U.S. federal judicial power to reside in "such inferior Courts every bit the Congress may from time to time ordain and plant."[25] Section 13 of the Judiciary Act sets out the Supreme Courtroom's original and appellate jurisdictions.

And be it farther enacted, That the Supreme Court shall have sectional [original] jurisdiction over all cases of a ceremonious nature where a land is a political party ... And shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers ... The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the excursion courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after specially provided for; and shall accept power to issue ... writs of mandamus, in cases warranted past the principles and usages of law, to whatsoever courts appointed, or persons holding part, under the potency of the United States.

—Judiciary Act of 1789, Section 13 (accent added)

Marbury had argued that the linguistic communication of Section 13 of the Judiciary Human activity gave the Supreme Court the say-so to outcome writs of mandamus when hearing cases nether original jurisdiction, non just appellate jurisdiction.[24] As Marshall explains in the opinion, original jurisdiction gives a court the power to be the kickoff to hear and determine a case; appellate jurisdiction gives a court the ability to hear an appeal from a lower court's conclusion and to "revise and right" the previous decision.[8] Although the language on the ability to issue writs of mandamus appears after Section 13'due south judgement on appellate jurisdiction, rather than with the earlier sentences on original jurisdiction, a semicolon separates it from the clause on appellate jurisdiction. The section does not brand clear whether the mandamus clause was intended to be read as function of the appellate clause or on its own—in the opinion, Marshall quoted simply the end of the department[26]—and the law's diction tin plausibly be read either manner.[27] In the end, the Courtroom agreed with Marbury and interpreted section 13 of the Judiciary Deed to have authorized the Court to exercise original jurisdiction over cases involving disputes over writs of mandamus.[28] [29]

But as Marshall pointed out, this meant that the Judiciary Act contradicted Article 3 of the U.S. Constitution, which establishes the judicial branch of the U.S. regime. Article Iii defines the Supreme Courtroom'south jurisdiction as follows:

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Courtroom shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and nether such Regulations equally the Congress shall make.

—U.S. Constitution, Article Three, Section 2 (accent added).

Article III says that the Supreme Court only has original jurisdiction over cases where a U.South. state is a party to a lawsuit or where a lawsuit involves foreign dignitaries. Neither of these categories covered Marbury's lawsuit, which was a dispute over a writ of mandamus for his justice of the peace commission. So, co-ordinate to the Constitution, the Court did non accept original jurisdiction over a case like Marbury's.[8] [28]

Just the Court had interpreted the Judiciary Human activity to have given it original jurisdiction over lawsuits for writs of mandamus. This meant that the Judiciary Act had taken the Constitution's initial scope for the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, which did not embrace cases involving writs of mandamus, and expanded information technology to include them. The Court ruled that Congress cannot increase the Supreme Courtroom's original jurisdiction as it was gear up down in the Constitution, and it therefore held that the relevant portion of Department 13 of the Judiciary Act violated Article 3 of the Constitution.[28]

Judicial review and striking downwards the law

Later ruling that it conflicted with the Constitution, the Courtroom struck down Section thirteen of the Judiciary Act in the U.South. Supreme Court'due south first e'er declaration of the power of judicial review.[8] [30] The Courtroom ruled that American federal courts have the power to refuse to give any outcome to congressional legislation that is inconsistent with their interpretation of the Constitution—a motion known as "hit downward" laws.[31]

The U.South. Constitution does not explicitly give the American judiciary the ability of judicial review.[32] Nevertheless, Marshall's opinion gives a number of reasons in support of the judiciary's possession of the power. Kickoff, the Court reasoned that the written nature of the Constitution inherently established judicial review.[33] [34] Borrowing from Alexander Hamilton's essay Federalist No. 78, Marshall wrote:

The powers of the legislature are divers and express; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written. ... Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the key and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an human activity of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.

— Marbury, 5 U.South. at 176–77.[35]

Second, the Court alleged that deciding the constitutionality of the laws it applies is an inherent part of the American judiciary's role.[36] In what has become the most famous and frequently quoted line of the stance, Marshall wrote:

Information technology is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.

— Marbury, five U.S. at 177.[37]

Marshall reasoned that the Constitution places limits on the American regime'due south powers, and that those limits would be meaningless unless they were subject to judicial review and enforcement.[34] [36] He reasoned that the Constitution's provisions limiting Congress's power—such as the consign tax clause or the prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex postal service facto laws—meant that in some cases judges would exist forced to choose between enforcing the Constitution or following Congress.[38] Marshall held "most as a matter of atomic number 26 logic" that in the event of conflict between the Constitution and statutory laws passed by Congress, the constitutional police must be supreme.[8]

Third, the Courtroom said that denying the supremacy of the Constitution over Congress'south acts would mean that "courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and meet only the police force."[39] This, Marshall wrote, would make Congress omnipotent, since none of the laws it passed would e'er be invalid.[34]

This doctrine ... would declare, that if the legislature shall exercise what is expressly forbidden, such act, yet the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical and existent omnipotence, with the same jiff which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits.

— Marbury, five U.South. at 178.[forty]

Marshall then gave several other reasons in favor of judicial review. He reasoned that the authorization in Article 3 of the Constitution that the Court can decide cases arising "under this Constitution" implied that the Court had the power to strike down laws conflicting with the Constitution.[36] This, Marshall wrote, meant that the Founders were willing to accept the American judiciary use and interpret the Constitution when judging cases. He also said that federal judges' oaths of office—in which they swear to discharge their duties impartially and "agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States"—requires them to back up the Constitution.[41] Lastly, Marshall reasoned that judicial review is unsaid in the Supremacy Clause of Commodity Six of the U.S. Constitution, since it declares that the supreme law of the Usa is the Constitution and laws fabricated "in Pursuance thereof", rather than the Constitution and all federal laws generally.[42] [41]

Having given his list of reasons, Marshall concluded the Court's opinion by reaffirming the Court'due south ruling on the invalidity of Section 13 of the Judiciary Act and, therefore, the Court'southward inability to issue Marbury'southward writ of mandamus.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written Constitutions, that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts, also as other departments, are jump by that instrument. The rule must be discharged.

— Marbury, five U.Southward. at 180.

Analysis

Political dilemma

Primary justice John Marshall, equally painted by Henry Inman in 1832, afterwards having presided over the American federal judiciary for over xxx years

Likewise its legal problems, the case of Marbury v. Madison also created a hard political dilemma for John Marshall and the Supreme Court.[43] If the Court had ruled in Marbury's favor and issued a writ of mandamus ordering Madison to deliver Marbury'southward commission, Jefferson and Madison would probably have just ignored information technology, which would have made the Courtroom await impotent and emphasized the "shakiness" of the judiciary.[43] On the other hand, a simple ruling confronting Marbury would have given Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans a articulate political victory over the Federalists.[43] Marshall solved both problems. Get-go, he had the Court rule that Madison's withholding of Marbury'southward commission was illegal, which pleased the Federalists. But the opinion he wrote also held that the Courtroom could non grant Marbury his requested writ of mandamus, which gave Jefferson and the Autonomous-Republicans the result they desired.

Merely in what the American legal scholar Laurence Tribe calls "an oft-told tale ... [that] remains awe-inspiring", Marshall had the Courtroom rule against Marbury in a fashion that maneuvered Marbury's simple petition for a writ of mandamus into a example that presented a question that went to the heart of American constitutional law itself.[44] The American political historian Robert G. McCloskey describes:

[Marbury v. Madison] is a masterwork of indirection, a brilliant example of Marshall's capacity to sidestep danger while seeming to court it. ... The danger of a head-on clash with the Jeffersonians was averted by the denial of jurisdiction: but, at the same time, the proclamation that the commission was illegally withheld scotched any impression that the Court condoned the administration's behavior. These negative maneuvers were artful achievements in their ain right. But the bear on of genius is evident when Marshall, not content with having rescued a bad situation, seizes the occasion to set forth the doctrine of judicial review. It is easy for united states to run across in hindsight that the occasion was golden, ... just merely a judge of Marshall's discernment could have recognized it.[45]

Marshall had been looking for a instance suitable for introducing judicial review and was eager to apply the situation in Marbury to establish his claim.[46] He introduced judicial review—a move Jefferson decried—but used it to strike down a provision of a police that he read to take expanded the Supreme Court'south powers, and thereby produced Jefferson's -to-be result of Marbury losing his case.[47] Marshall "seized the occasion to uphold the institution of judicial review, but he did so in the class of reaching a judgment that his political opponents could neither defy nor protest."[48] Though Jefferson criticized the Court's decision, he accepted it, and Marshall's opinion in Marbury "articulate[d] a role for the federal courts that survives to this mean solar day."[49] The American legal scholar Erwin Chemerinsky concludes: "The brilliance of Marshall's opinion cannot be overstated."[47]

Legal criticism

Marshall'due south historic opinion in Marbury 5. Madison continues to be the discipline of critical analysis and inquiry.[l] In a 1955 Harvard Law Review article, U.Due south. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter emphasized that one can criticize Marshall'due south opinion in Marbury without demeaning information technology: "The courage of Marbury five. Madison is not minimized by suggesting that its reasoning is non impeccable and its determination, however wise, not inevitable."[51]

Criticisms of Marshall's stance in Marbury usually fall into two general categories.[50] Get-go, some criticize the style Marshall "strove" to reach the decision that the U.S. Supreme Courtroom has constitutional potency over the other branches of the U.Southward. government. Today, American courts generally follow the principle of "constitutional abstention": if a certain interpretation of a law raises constitutional problems, they adopt to employ alternative interpretations that avoid these problems, and so long equally the alternative interpretations are still plausible.[52] In Marbury, Marshall could have avoided the constitutional questions through different legal rulings: for instance, if he had ruled that Marbury did not accept a correct to his committee until it was delivered, or if he had ruled that refusals to honour political appointments could only be remedied through the political procedure and not the judicial procedure, it would have ended the case immediately and the Court would not accept reached the example'due south constitutional bug.[53] Marshall did not practice so, and many legal scholars have criticized him for it.[52] Some scholars take responded that the "constitutional avoidance" principle did not exist in 1803, and in any case is "only a general guide for Court action", not an "ironclad rule".[54] Alternatively, information technology has as well been argued that the claim that Marshall "strove" to create a controversy largely vanishes when the case is viewed from the legal perspective of the late 18th century, when American colonies' and states' supreme courts were largely modeled on England'due south Court of King'southward Bench, which inherently possessed mandamus powers.[55]

Second, Marshall'due south arguments for the Court'due south authority are sometimes said to exist mere "series of assertions", rather than substantive reasons logically laid out to support his position.[56] Scholars mostly concur that Marshall'south serial of assertions regarding the U.S. Constitution and the actions of the other branches of government practice not "inexorably lead to the conclusion that Marshall draws from them."[56] Marshall's assertion of the American judiciary'due south authority to review executive co-operative deportment was the most controversial effect when Marbury was get-go decided, and several subsequent U.Southward. presidents have tried to dispute it, to varying degrees.[56]

Additionally, it is questionable whether Marshall should take participated in the Marbury case because of his participating part in the dispute.[14] Marshall was even so the acting secretary of country when the nominations were made, and he had signed Marbury and the other men's commissions and had been responsible for their commitment.[14] This potential disharmonize of interest raises stiff grounds for Marshall to have recused himself from the case.[14] In retrospect, the fact that Marshall did not recuse himself from Marbury is likely indicative of his eagerness to hear the case and employ it to establish judicial review.[53]

Legacy

Marbury v. Madison is regarded equally the unmarried most important conclusion in American constitutional constabulary.[1] Information technology established U.S. federal judges' authority to review the constitutionality of Congress'due south legislative acts,[1] and to this mean solar day the Supreme Court'southward ability to review the constitutionality of American laws at both the federal and country level "is generally rested upon the epic decision of Marbury 5. Madison."[57]

Although the Court'due south stance in Marbury established judicial review in American federal law, it did not invent or create it. Some 18th-century British jurists had argued that English language courts had the power to circumscribe Parliament.[58] The thought became widely accepted in Colonial America—especially in Marshall'southward native Virginia—under the rationale that in America only the people were sovereign, rather than the government, then the courts should only implement legitimate laws.[58] [59] By the time of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, American courts' "contained power and duty to interpret the law" was well established,[60] and Hamilton had defended the concept in Federalist No. 78. Yet, Marshall's stance in Marbury was the power's start announcement and exercise by the Supreme Courtroom. Information technology made the practice more routine, rather than exceptional, and prepared the style for the Courtroom'southward stance in the 1819 example McCulloch v. Maryland, in which Marshall implied that the Supreme Courtroom was the supreme interpreter of the U.Due south. Constitution.[61]

Although it is a potent check on the other branches of the U.South. government, federal courts rarely exercised the power of judicial review in early American history. After deciding Marbury in 1803, the Supreme Court did not strike down another federal police until 1857, when the Court struck down the Missouri Compromise in its now-infamous decision Dred Scott v. Sandford, a ruling that contributed to the outbreak of the American Civil War.[62]

See also

  • Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth
  • Calder v. Balderdash
  • Hylton v. United States
  • Martin v. Hunter'southward Lessee

References

Notes

  1. ^ The U.Due south. Constitution originally had new presidents take office in early on March, which left a 4-month gap between elections the previous November and presidential inaugurations. This inverse in 1933 with the adoption of the Twentieth Subpoena to the U.S. Constitution, which moved presidential inaugurations upward to Jan 20 and thereby reduced the menstruation between elections and inaugurations to about 2-and-a-half months.
  2. ^ In retaliation for Adams's date of the "Midnight Judges", Jefferson and the new Democratic-Republican Congressmen passed a nib that canceled the Supreme Courtroom's 1802 term. This prevented all its awaiting cases, including Marbury v. Madison, from being decided until 1803.
  3. ^ Due to illnesses, justices William Cushing and Alfred Moore did not sit for oral argument or participate in the Court'due south determination.

Citations

  1. ^ a b c d Chemerinsky (2019), § 2.2.one, p. 39.
  2. ^ a b McCloskey (2010), p. 25.
  3. ^ a b Chemerinsky (2019), § 2.2.one, pp. 39–xl.
  4. ^ a b Pohlman (2005), p. 21.
  5. ^ a b Chemerinsky (2019), § ii.2.one, p. xl.
  6. ^ a b Chemerinsky (2019), § 2.two.i, pp. 41–42.
  7. ^ Chemerinsky (2019), § 2.2.1, p. 44.
  8. ^ a b c d east Epstein (2014), p. 89.
  9. ^ McCloskey (2010), pp. 23–24.
  10. ^ a b c d e Chemerinsky (2019), § ii.2.ane, p. twoscore.
  11. ^ Brest et al. (2018), p. 115.
  12. ^ Miller (2009), p. 44.
  13. ^ Paulsen et al. (2013), p. 141.
  14. ^ a b c d e Chemerinsky (2019), § 2.2.1, p. 41.
  15. ^ Chemerinsky (2019), § two.2.one, p. 41.
  16. ^ Chemerinsky (2019), § ii.two.one, p. 42.
  17. ^ Amar (1989), p. 447.
  18. ^ Amar (1987), pp. 1485–86.
  19. ^ Amar (1987), p. 1486.
  20. ^ Brest et al. (2018), pp. 124–25.
  21. ^ Chemerinsky (2019), § 2.2.1, pp. 42–43.
  22. ^ Chemerinsky (2019), § 2.2.1, p. 41, quoting Marbury, v U.S. at 163.
  23. ^ The Old Supreme Court Chamber, 1810–1860 (PDF). Office of Senate Curator (Report). U.Southward. Senate Committee on Art. 2015-06-24 [2014-02-ten]. S. Pub. 113-iii.
  24. ^ a b Chemerinsky (2019), § two.2.1, p. 43.
  25. ^ Chemerinsky (2012), pp. iii, 9 (quoting U.S. Constitution, Article III, Department 1).
  26. ^ Van Alstyne (1969), p. 15.
  27. ^ Nowak & Rotunda (2012), § 1.3, p. 50.
  28. ^ a b c Chemerinsky (2019), § two.ii.1, p. 44.
  29. ^ Fallon et al. (2015), pp. 69–70.
  30. ^ Currie (1997), p. 53.
  31. ^ Tribe (2000), p. 207.
  32. ^ Tribe (2000), pp. 207–08.
  33. ^ Prakash & Yoo (2003), p. 914.
  34. ^ a b c Tribe (2000), p. 210.
  35. ^ Quoted in role in Chemerinsky (2019), § ii.ii.one, p. 45, and Tribe (2000), p. 210.
  36. ^ a b c Chemerinsky (2019), § 2.2.1, p. 45.
  37. ^ Quoted in Chemerinsky (2019), § 2.2.1, p. 45.
  38. ^ Nowak & Rotunda (2012), § 1.three, pp. 52–53.
  39. ^ Tribe (2000), p. 210, quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178.
  40. ^ Quoted in Tribe (2000), p. 210.
  41. ^ a b Nowak & Rotunda (2012), § 1.3, p. 53.
  42. ^ Chemerinsky (2019), § ii.2.1, p. 46.
  43. ^ a b c McCloskey (2010), p. 26.
  44. ^ Tribe (2000), p. 208, notation 5.
  45. ^ McCloskey (2010), pp. 25–27.
  46. ^ Nowak & Rotunda (2012), § 1.4(a), p. 55.
  47. ^ a b Chemerinsky (2019), § 2.2.1, p. 46.
  48. ^ Fallon et al. (2015), p. 69.
  49. ^ Chemerinsky (2019), § 2.two.i, pp. 46–47.
  50. ^ a b Nowak & Rotunda (2012), § 1.4(a), p. 54.
  51. ^ Frankfurter (1955), p. 219
  52. ^ a b Brest et al. (2018), pp. 133–34.
  53. ^ a b Nowak & Rotunda (2012), § 1.4(a), p. 55.
  54. ^ Nowak & Rotunda (2012), §i.iv(a), pp. 55–56.
  55. ^ Pfander (2001), pp. 1518–19.
  56. ^ a b c Nowak & Rotunda (2012), § 1.4(a), p. 56.
  57. ^ Van Alstyne (1969), p. 1.
  58. ^ a b Cornell & Leonard (2008), p. 540.
  59. ^ Treanor (2005), p. 556.
  60. ^ Paulsen (2003), p. 2707.
  61. ^ Cornell & Leonard (2008), p. 542.
  62. ^ Chemerinsky (2019), § 2.ii.1, p. 47.

Works cited

  • Amar, Akhil Reed (1987). "Of Sovereignty and Federalism". Yale Law Journal. 96 (7): 1425–1520. doi:10.2307/796493. JSTOR 796493.
  • Amar, Akhil Reed (1989). "Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court". Academy of Chicago Law Review. 56 (2): 443–99. doi:10.2307/1599844. JSTOR 1599844.
  • Brest, Paul; Levinson, Sanford; Balkin, Jack One thousand.; Amar, Akhil Reed; Siegel, Reva B. (2018). Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials (7th ed.). New York: Wolters Kluwer. ISBN978-1-4548-8749-2.
  • Chemerinsky, Erwin (2012). Federal Jurisdiction (6th ed.). New York: Wolters Kluwer. ISBN978-1-4548-0402-iv.
  • Chemerinsky, Erwin (2019). Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies (6th ed.). New York: Wolters Kluwer. ISBN978-1-4548-9574-ix.
  • Cornell, Saul; Leonard, Gerald (2008). "The Consolidation of the Early Federal System, 1791–1812". In Grossberg, Michael; Tomlins, Christopher (eds.). The Cambridge History of Law in America, Volume I: Early on America (1580–1815). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 518–54. ISBN978-0-521-80305-2.
  • Currie, David P. (1997). The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period 1789–1801. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN9780226131146.
  • Epstein, Richard A. (2014). The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Express Authorities. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. ISBN978-0-674-72489-1.
  • Fallon, Richard H., Jr.; Manning, John F.; Meltzer, Daniel J.; Shapiro, David L. (2015). Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System (7th ed.). St. Paul, Minnesota: Foundation Press. ISBN978-1-60930-427-0.
  • Frankfurter, Felix (1955). "John Marshall and the Judicial Function". Harvard Police force Review. 69 (2): 217–38. doi:ten.2307/1337866. JSTOR 1337866.
  • McCloskey, Robert G. (2010). The American Supreme Court. Revised by Sanford Levinson (fifth ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN978-0-226-55686-4.
  • Miller, Mark Carlton (2009). The View of the Courts from the Hill: Interactions Between Congress and the Federal Judiciary. Charlottesville: Academy of Virginia Printing. ISBN9780813928104.
  • Nowak, John Due east.; Rotunda, Ronald D. (2012). Treatise on Ramble Law: Substance and Procedure (5th ed.). Eagan, Minnesota: West. OCLC 798148265.
  • Paulsen, Michael Stokes (2003). "The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury". Michigan Police force Review. 101 (8): 2706–43. doi:10.2307/3595393. JSTOR 3595393.
  • Paulsen, Michael Stokes; Calabresi, Steven One thousand.; McConnell, Michael W.; Bray, Samuel (2013). The Constitution of the United States. University Casebook Serial (2d ed.). St. Paul: Foundation Press. ISBN978-1-60930-271-9.
  • Pfander, James E. (2001). "Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Courtroom's Supervisory Powers". Columbia Law Review. 101 (7): 1515–1612. doi:10.2307/1123808. JSTOR 1123808.
  • Pohlman, H. L. (2005). Constitutional Argue in Action: Governmental Powers. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN978-0-7425-3593-0.
  • Prakash, Saikrishna; Yoo, John (2003). "The Origins of Judicial Review". University of Chicago Law Review. 70 (3): 887–982. doi:ten.2307/1600662. JSTOR 1600662.
  • Treanor, William Michael (2005). "Judicial Review Before Marbury". Stanford Police force Review. 58 (2): 455–562. JSTOR 40040272.
  • Tribe, Laurence H. (2000). American Ramble Law (3rd ed.). New York: Foundation Printing. ISBN978-1-56662-714-6.
  • Van Alstyne, William (1969). "A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison". Duke Law Periodical. 18 (1): ane–49.

Further reading

  • Nelson, William E. (2000). Marbury v. Madison: The Origins and Legacy of Judicial Review . University Printing of Kansas. ISBN978-0-7006-1062-four. (i introduction to the case)
  • Clinton, Robert Lowry (1991). Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review. Academy Press of Kansas. ISBN978-0-7006-0517-0. (Claims that it is a mistake to read the case every bit claiming a judicial power to tell the President or Congress what they can or cannot exercise under the Constitution.)
  • Irons, Peter H. (1999). A People's History of the Supreme Court. Penguin Books. pp. 104–107. ISBN978-0-14-029201-5.
  • Newmyer, R. Kent (2001). John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court. Louisiana Land University Press. ISBN978-0-8071-3249-4.
  • James M. O'Fallon, The Case of Benjamin More: A Lost Episode in the Struggle over Repeal of the 1801 Judiciary Act, 11 Constabulary & Hist. Rev. 43 (1993).
  • Tushnet, Mark (2008). I dissent: Smashing Opposing Opinions in Landmark Supreme Court Cases. Boston: Beacon Press. pp. i–sixteen. ISBN978-0-8070-0036-6.
  • Sloan, Cliff; McKean, David (2009). The Corking Conclusion: Jefferson, Adams, Marshall and the Battle for the Supreme Courtroom. New York, NY: PublicAffairs. ISBN978-i-58648-426-2.
  • Trachtman, Michael Thou. (2016-09-06). The Supremes' Greatest Hits, 2nd Revised & Updated Edition: The 44 Supreme Court Cases That Nigh Directly Touch Your Life (Tertiary, Revised ed.). Sterling. ISBN9781454920779.

External links

  • Text of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) is available from:Cornell Findlaw Justia Library of Congress OpenJurist
  • Master Documents in American History: Marbury 5. Madison from the Library of Congress
  • "John Marshall, Marbury v. Madison, and Judicial Review—How the Court Became Supreme" Lesson plan for grades 9–12 from National Endowment for the Humanities
  • The 200th Anniversary of Marbury v. Madison: The Reasons We Should Still Intendance About the Decision, and The Lingering Questions It Left Behind
  • The Establishment of Judicial Review
  • The 200th Anniversary of Marbury five. Madison: The Supreme Court'due south Showtime Not bad Case
  • Case Brief for Marbury v. Madison at Lawnix.com
  • The short film Marbury five. Madison (1977) is available for free download at the Internet Archive.
  • "Supreme Courtroom Landmark Instance Marbury v. Madison" from C-Span'southward Landmark Cases: Historic Supreme Court Decisions

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marbury_v._Madison

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